Evaluating Programme Aid: by White, Howard
1 Introduction
Programme aid is an important component of aid.
During the years of US domination of bilateral
aid, food aid, much of it programme food aid, was
a central element of international assistance. As
food aid has declined in importance, financial pro-
gramme aid has become firmly established. In the
period 1990-93, financial programme aid (includ-
ing debt relief) averaged 22 per cent of DAC aid
to all developing countries and 28 per cent of that
to sub-Saharan Africa; (the figures for 1985-89 are
15 and 22 per cent respectively). What is the role
of programme aid and what has it achieved?
A review of the available evidence reveals that the
objectives of programme aid are frequently unclear,
or, if stated, the mechanisms by which they are to
be achieved not spelt out. This state of affairs
bodes poorly for evaluation - and indeed there is
no agreed framework for evaluating programme
aid. The Swedish International Development
Agency (SIDA)' suggested that it would be useful
to review current practices in this area, as basis for
future methodological development. A workshop
at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague was
the result. This Bulletin sets out a new approach
to the methodology of programme aid evaluation
and the programme aid evaluations of seven donors
(Denmark, European Union, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom)
are reviewed. It also considers how to evaluate the
poverty impact of programme aid.
2 What is Programme Aid?
Different terms - programme aid, balance of pay-
ments support and import support - are often used
interchangeably Properly speaking, they are not so.
As shown in Figure 1, BOP support is a sub- set of
programme aid and import support a sub- set of
BOP support. In addition to BOP support, pro-
gramme aid also includes budget support and BOP
support also includes debt relief (see discussion of
debt relief in articles by White and Addison). It is
also important to distinguish financial aid from food
aid. Programme food aid has a long history from
the Marshall Plan to the current day2 It has also
Funding for this workshop was received from SIDA,
NORAD and DANIDA, and is gratefully acknowledged.
2 See the discussion in Clay (1995).
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been recognized that, despite the imposition of usual
marketing requirements (UMR), food aid partially
displaces commercial imports so that even non-pro-
gramme food aid is in part effectively a gift of untied
forex. The papers from the workshop are concerned
with financial programme aid, but this paper will
draw also on the experience from programme food
aid.
The common feature of all these types of aid is
that they are not intended to finance the activities
of a specific project, this aspect being the core of
the definition given by DAC's Principles for
Programme Assistance: 'Programme assistance
consists of all contributions made available to a
recipient country for general development purposes
i.e. balance-of-payments support, general budget
support and commodity assistance, not linked to
specific project activities.' (OECD 1991: 5) The
DAC's classification of programme aid makes a
further distinction between general programme
assistance and sector programme assistance
(OECD 1991: 21).
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Here the main features of these different forms of
programme aid are described with a short overview
of their quantitative significance.
Types of programme aid
Budget support
Budget support is the donation of forex which is
sold to raise local currency to support the govern-
ment budget. The donor may specify sectors of the
budget (e.g. health and education) which it would
like to see supported by the aid (but not, of course,
specific project activities). No limitation is placed
by the donor on the use of the forex, which will be
sold through the Central Bank.
Modalities of import support
Import support may be classified into three types:
(i) commodity aid (often called commodity import
support, CIS), which may or may not be project
specific3 (see following page for footnote); (ii) Open
General Licence (OGL) systems; and (iii) retroactive
financing. Each of these is discussed in turn.
Budget support
(free forex given
for sale to raise
local currency to
support govern-
ment budget)
Import support
(forex or
commodities
untied to project
activities)
Table I Definition of programme aid and balance of payments support
Programme
aid
Programme
food aid
Financial
programme
aid
Balance of
payments support
Debt relief
Commodity support provides either specified
commodities or funds for the purchase of these com-
modities. In some cases the commodities may be
destined for use in a particular project. In others,
such as maize or fertilizer, they may be intended for
sale through government distribution networks (or
by government to the private sector for distribu-
tion). In more recent years, donors have refrained
from specifying the commodities to be imported,
using instead a positive list of items for which the
funds may be used. Access to the foreign exchange
to procure these imports has been administered by
government. Such systems fitted well in allocative
forex mechanisms common in much of sub-
Saharan Africa prior to forex market liberalisation
under adjustment.
However, allocative systems have come to be seen
by most donors as open to abuse and a potentially
major distortion to the market allocation of
resources. As recipients have moved toward more
market-based forex systems, donors have shifted
toward a mechanism known as Open General
Licence (OGL). OGL systems in general operated
with negative lists - schedules of goods which may
not be imported with the funds - rather than the
more restrictive positive lists used with CIS.
Experience in implementing these schemes has
made them more liberal over time, including the
use of retroactive allocation of funds to imports
which have already taken place. Import support
may also be retroactive financing of imports
already made outside of the OGL system - being
accounted against items such as oil and maize.
Debt relief
There are two relevant issues that an evaluation of
aid for debt relief should cover. First, the receipt of
debt relief is usually conditional upon adoption of a
reform programme - so that an evaluation of BOF
support should look at the implementation of that
programme and its effects. Second, the macroeco-
nomic impact of the debt relief should be consid-
ered. These issues are pursued later in this paper.
Some import support may therefore not really be
programme aid, as it violates the condition of not being
targeted at a particular project.
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A word on counterpart funds
Counterpart funds are the funds raised by the sale
of the forex or commodities.4 In the case of budget
support, the donor is interested in the use of the
local currency and not the forex. In the case of
BOP support the donor's concern is the balance of
payments, and also to worry about the use of the
local currency is dubbed double tying. Nonethe-
less, evidence that aid-financed commodities were
used to subsidize ailing parastatals, or even for
political patronage, drew donor attention to the col-
lection of countervalue at a market rate. Some
donors go further to specify the use of these funds
once collected. Thus, despite DAC guidelines to
the contrary, Maxwell concludes that rumours of
the death of counterpart fund earmarking are
somewhat exaggerated'.
Hence counterpart funds raise for the evaluator
similar issues to budget aid. First, were the mecha-
nisms by which the foreign exchange was converted
to local currency transparent and free from undesir-
able distortions? Second, what has been the impact
of the local funds on the level and composition of
government expenditure? Thïrd, what has been the
incidence of these changes on government expendi-
ture (who has benefited?) and with what impact on
macroeconomic performance and welfare?
Does the type of programme aid matter?
A recent ODA document argues that the macro-
economic impact of providing balance of payments
support is identical to that of providing budgetary
support' (ODA 1995: para. 2.4). Is this so? From
the donor's point of view the label attached to the
aid does matter as it directs their attention to a
particular sphere - toward the foreign exchange
sphere for balance of payments support and to fis-
cal behaviour and budgetary mechanisms for bud-
get aid. The design of agreements and the content
of evaluation reports will vary according to what
the aid is called. But does the impact of the aid
vary according to its name? It will do so provided
donor efforts to promote reform reap any reward.
A stricter definition of counterpart funds adds the
condition that they should be local monies over which the
donor retains some control. However, at least in name - if
not in practice - many donors refrain from tying these funds
- hence they would not qualify as counterpart funds by this
definition, even though the donor may be legitimately
concerned with their effects.
The importance of programme aid
The DAC figures show a trailing off of programme
aid in the l99Os (Table 2). But these figures
exclude debt relief, which has risen from around 2
per cent to over 10 per cent of total aid between
the mid 1980s and the early 1990s. In the case of
sub-Saharan Africa the share of debt relief in total
DAC aid reached 17 per cent in 1994, so that pro-
gramme aid inclusive of debt relief was one third
of all aid to the continent in that year.
The share of programme aid in the aid budget
varies not only by recipient but also by donor.
Around one quarter of Sweden's aid to its pro-
gramme countries has routinely been programme
aid, whereas such flows have only once exceeded
ten per cent of Danish aid. And whilst programme
aid has maintained its share of the Swedish aid
budget, it has fallen in recent years for other
donors (Denmark, Norway and the UK), but risen
quite sharply for Japan. The composition of pro-
gramme aid has also changed. One development
already noted is the growth of debt relief, which
has been very marked in the Japanese case. The
shift away from commodity import support to
more liberal mechanisms for import support are
also evident in the data for Denmark and Japan
(the only two cases for which the data allow such a
breakdown).
3 Evaluating Programme Aid:
Concepts and Issues
The distinction between monitoring and evaluation
can refer either to the stage or the depth of the
analysis, or both. In the former case, monitoring is
a regular process throughout the life of the project,5
whereas evaluation is carried out on completion of
the project (or even three to five years later). This
distinction may be related to the second possible
difference, which concerns the depth of analysis, as
monitoring is more concerned with efficiency and
effectiveness, and evaluation with impact. It is to
these concepts that I now turn.
The term project is used here, even though the evaluation
of programme aid is the subject of discussion. These
techniques have, as a rule, not been applied to programme
aid, and the difficulties of so doing are discussed below
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The Logical Framework
Many donors use the logical framework (often
called the log frame) as a tool in project planning
and design. The log frame is intended to ensure
that project design is internally consistent - that
is, that the project activities are in tune with the
stated objectives. The framework consists of four
stages: (i) inputs; (ii) activities; (iii) outputs; and
(iv) objectives. Objectives consistent with recipient
and donor priorities should first be set (e.g. higher
economic growth, increase maize yields, and raise
incomes of rural landless), and then outputs iden-
tified which will help realise these objectives (e.g.
increased investment, increased use of high yielding
varieties, and creation of short-term, low value
credit facilities).5 Next the activities needed to
generate these outputs can be planned (financial
market liberalization, expanded coverage of exten-
sion services, and promotion of rural-based finan-
cial institutions), and the required inputs listed
(revised legal framework, provision of training and
vehicles, and capital for fund to underwrite risk).
The advantage of the log frame is that it encourages
clear identification of objectives, and that project
activities are related to these objectives. As dis-
cussed below, this is a focus that many donors
would have done well to apply to programme aid.
However, with one exception, donors have not used
the logical framework for programme aid. The
exception is the European Union, which, as
described by Caputo (1996) has tried to apply the
log frame in the evaluation of their balance of
payments support - the following discussion draws
on this experience. Caputo also points to the dis-
advantage that the log frame can have in imposing
an over-rigid framework for analysis: 'some of the
evaluation teams found that a pressure in this sense
had been very energy consuming and detrimental
for evaluation results'.
The terms efficiency, effectiveness and impact refer to
processes linking the stages of the log frame. Hence,
efficiency refers to how well inputs are used in carry-
ing out activities and effectiveness to the extent
which these activities produce the desired outputs.
The distinction between outputs and objectives may not
be so hard-and-fast as suggested in this discussion. Addison
(1996) distinguishes between immediate objectives and
long-term objectives; these two concepts may often
correspond to outputs and objectives respectively - but
again there is a grey area.
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The achievement of objectives is the subject of
impact analysis. A fourth area, relevance, pertains to
how meaningful are the objectives in a counny's cur-
rent circumstances (e.g. what does the objective
'relieving the foreign exchange constraint' mean in a
country with a flexible exchange rate regime?). For
each of these four areas indicators can be developed
to assist the donor in monitoring and evaluation.
Putting Programme Aid in the Log Frame
How can these concepts be applied to programme
aid? The first important decision is whether to
evaluate the impact of the reform programme sup-
ported by the programme aid, the programme aid
funds themselves or both. The practice of some
donors (e.g. Japan, the United States and the World
Bank) has been just to evaluate the reform pro-
gramme. Some participants of the workshop
defended this view, arguing that policy change is
the main channel for the beneficial effects of this
type of aid. But some countries have received very
substantial volumes of programme aid. These
funds could have been put to other uses (e.g. pri-
mary education) or given to other countries. We
should want to know what effects this money is
having. Conceivably, the reform programme can
be supported by donors by attaching conditionality
to other flows. Or we can ask why donors should
anyway pay a country to implement a programme
that is supposed to be (i) owned by that country;
and (ii) for that country's benefit. If the answer is
that the adjustment process requires financing we
are brought back to the fact that we should there-
fore evaluate how well it has done so.
A second argument is that we should not evaluate
impact, as such an activity requires modelling of a
complexity beyond the scope of a simple evaluation.
Rather, evaluation studies of programme aid should
focus on collecting indicators of efficiency and effec-
tiveness. However, the modelling effort required for
evaluating programme aid is no greater than that for
a proper social cost-benefit analysis.7 If donors are
to evaluate programme aid as a coordinated effort -
one area of agreement in the workshop discussions -
then impact evaluation should not be beyond them.
Of course, most donors do not practice proper cost-
benefit analysis. For a rather sad assessment of the state
affairs at the World Bank - which is probably better than
most other donors ici this regard - see Little and Mirrlees
(1991).
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Section 4 discusses the details of the evaluation of
programme aid at all levels of the log frame, dealing
in turn with the effects of policies and funds. Table
3 provides a summary overview.
4 Issues in the Evaluation of
Programme Aid
Defining the Objectives of Programme Aid
The first lesson from the country case studies is
that donors have not been clear on the objectives
of this aid - certainly with respect to the purpose
of the funds and often equally to the reform
programme - with adverse consequences for evalu-
ation. For example: 'before discussing any evalua-
tion methodology there must be clarity on what to
evaluate' (Eeckhout et al. 1996: 11); 'the pro-
grammes aim should be clearly identified'
(Sakamoto 1996: 65); and 'the first task in evaluat-
ing either programme or project aid is to identify
the channels through which it affects poor people'
(Addison 1996: 80).
The paper by Eeckhout et at. on Dutch aid devotes
considerable attention to the disjuncture between
the objectives of programme aid and the focus of
evaluations. First, they argue that the objectives of
programme aid have changed between the pre-
adjustment period and the adjustment period. In
the earlier period the objective was the micro/meso
one of supporting sectors suffering from a forex
constraint, but since the adoption of adjustment
programmes the objective has been support for
reform. However, according to Eeckhout et al.
evaluation methodology has not changed accord-
ingly More specifically, the authors identify three
objectives against which programme aid should be
evaluated: (i) achievement of stabilization and
growth; (ii) progress in policy reform; and (iii) cre-
ation and sustainability of new market institutions.
The last of these has been dealt with through the
Joint Evaluation Missions (JEMs) - but by coinci-
dence rather than design. The JEM5 have been con-
cerned with efficiency and effectiveness: as
programme aid has become more market-based,
then analysis of these issues has meant an analysis
of forex (and, to a lesser extent, credit) market
institutions. However, the JEMs cannot be said to
have fulfilled a monitoring function as of the seven
countries which have received JEMs only three have
had more than one such mission.
In addition to these questions, Dutch evaluations
have assessed programme aid against the major
policy objectives for Dutch aid: combating poverty,
enhancing women's emancipation, and protecting
the environment. This focus contrasts with the
Swedish experience: de Vylder notes that the terms
of reference for evaluations have increasingly
focused on macroeconomic issues, and no evalua-
tion has addressed gender issues. Which is the
right approach? I would argue that the objectives
of programme aid - and thereby also the reform
programme - should be defined so as to embrace
the aid's social effects.8
The use of the log frame allows for identification of
both objectives and outputs, which permits specifi-
cation of indicators by which performance can be
measured. In the case of adjustment programmes
de Vylder argues that the expected macroeconomic
outcomes provided in the Policy Framework Paper
(PFP) should be seen as target performance levels
It is important, however, to bear in mind the warning that
Clay gives with regard to programme food aid of attempting
'to load a complex mix of conditions on a single instrument'
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and treated as such but they are not (1996). As
de Vylder says, no comparison of these predictions
is made against outturns in any systematic way.
The paper in this volume by Maxwell (1996) pro-
vides a list of performance indicators for monitor-
ing the management of counterpart funds, and a
further list for donor participation in public expen-
diture reviews. From the experiences reported in
the workshops, it is clear that most donors are not
even monitoring these efficiency and effectiveness
indicators on a routine basis - let alone any indica-
tors related to impact. Sakamoto's paper (1996)
appeals for a clear listing of impact indicators
related to the programme's expected effects; whilst
Sakamoto lists possible macroeconomic indicators
(such as export growth and inflation) it is clear
that social indicators (such as infant mortality or
child and infant anthropometric measures) should
be added to the list.
In response to the suggestion that monitoring
should cover social aspects it often responded that
'the data are not available'. But the collection of such
data is no less conceptually or practically difficult
than the macroeconomic aggregates to which con-
siderable resources are devoted. Moreover, existing
(1995: 357). Nonetheless, donors do believe programme
aid will affect all these things, so that the channels should
be made explicit.
Table 3 Log frame evaluation stages of programme aid
Effectiveness Market structure
Ef1ciency Speed and openness of
reform process
Note: Table constructed in relation to growth objective only.
Programme aid funds
Binding recurrent constraint
(forex or fiscal)
Change in level and composition
of imports and government
spending, and consequent effects for
macroeconomic performance and
welfare
Market structure and auditing
procedures
Donor procedures
Reform programme
Relevance Government commitment
to reform process
Impact Policy-induced change in
macroeconomic performance
and welfare
preventive health schemes and early warning sys-
tems for food security can provide the data for
monitoring of welfare indicators. Addison's paper
provides a full discussion of the relevant variables
and how they may best be monitored.
Evaluating the Reform Programme
The reform effort is monitored directly by the
World Bank, as the release of successive tranches is
conditional upon fulfilling the policy conditions
attached to the credit. Other donors take their lead
from the Bank, although most retain the option for
an independent assessment of the situation.9 In
practice the option for independent action on an
economic policy basis is not exercised (see, for
example, Tarp and Kragh 1996 on Denmark and
Renard and Reyntjens 1995 on Belgium) - indeed,
an individual bilateral donor's influence on macro
policy is determined by their relationship with the
IFIs rather than with the recipient. To the extent
that existing evaluations discuss the effect of pro-
gramme aid through the reform programme they
mostly just list the policy changes which have been
implemented. But from an analytical point of view
the programme aid cannot be said to have caused
these changes.
Discussion of the analysis of adjustment policies has
identified three methodological approaches: (i)
before versus after; (ii) control group approach; and
(iii) modelling (see, for example, Mosley et aI. 1991,
and White 1994: Ch. 2). What we are interested in
is: what would policies be now if the support had
not been received, but all other factors had
remained constant? i.e. the counterfactual, or, as
economists say, with versus without. The construc-
tion of the counterfactual is no easy matter, and
depends upon a combination of political and eco-
nomic analysis: if donors want to evaluate the pol-
icy impact of programme aid the evaluation team
should include political scientists as well as econo-
mists. Economics is important since the macro
position of the economy would be different in the
absence of the support and policy would have to
adapt to those different conditions.° But clearly
° So far as I am aware, only the UK disburses automatically
once the Bank has done so.
Thïs fact is embodied in the policy reaction function of
the modified control group approach. However, application
of the approach to a single countiy would almost certainly
be invalid.
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an analysis of the politics of the situation is also
required. A major objective of evaluation is to
provide lessons for future support. But this is
particularly problematic. Even if we conclude that
the programme would not have been implemented
without the support is this an all or nothing state-
ment; or could, say, only half as much have been
given and the reform programme still been sus-
tained? These are difficult questions to answer, but
the answers are crucial for those allocating aid to
different uses.
There is literature and experience that may be
drawn upon to make such an analysis. First, there
is the experience of programme food aid (see Clay
1995, for a discussion of food aid and conditional-
ity). The second area that can be drawn upon in
evaluating aid's effect on the reform process is the
political economy of economic reform (see, for
example, the papers in Widner 1994a).11 The eval-
uation teams for programme aid have to date
entirely been composed of economists and accoun-
tants - a fact decried in de Vylder's paper. In the
same paper de Vylder also comments that, 'it is, in
my view, to be regretted, that the TOR for the eval-
uations in no single case asked for at least a tenta-
tive analysis of the "political economy of economic
reform"; after all, structural adjustment is about
politics.'
So, although the evaluations of many donors focus
solely on the reform programme, they in fact stop
short of analysing the extent to which that pro-
gramme has depended upon programme aid.
Rather they analyse the effects of those policies on
the economy Here we are on much more well worn
ground - there is a growing literature on the impact
of adjustment policies, both in general and at coun-
try case studies. In conducting the analysis the
importance of achieving a with versus without
analysis should be borne in mind. Many studies in
the academic literature do not adopt such an
approach (see the review in White 1996) and much
of the evaluation literature follows the same route -
indeed two of the papers from the workshop
See also the papers in Stokke (1995) for a discussion of
political conditionality, although some authors also deal
with the effectiveness of economic conditionality
(those by Caputo and Sakamoto) advocate the
before versus after methodology that is to be found
in most evaluations.
Coordinated evaluation efforts
A final a point is, who should do the evaluation? It
is readily apparent that it makes no sense to evalu-
ate the programme aid of a single donor. As pro-
gramme aid must be evaluated as a whole, it makes
sense that the evaluation itself should be a collec-
tive exercise - the joint evaluation missions are a
recognition of this fact. Most donors have put their
faith in the World Bank to evaluate the reform pro-
gramme, and the DAC Principles for Programme
Assistance state that evaluations should include
the Bank. However, a review of available studies
suggests that the Bank has failed to address the
question of the link between aid and reform and, in
its country studies, presents often weak analysis of
the subsequent link from reform to results. Finally,
the Bank's evaluations pay no attention to the
macroeconomic impact of the programme funds.
Donors would thus do well to take responsibility
for evaluating their own programme aid.
At the ISS workshop some participants were scepti-
cal of the possibility of coordinated evaluations.
However, there is a spectrum of coordination,
along which the following activities were identified:
sharing the timetable of planned evaluations:
distributing TORS for forthcoming evaluations
for information and/or feedback; (iii) agreeing a
common TOR for evaluations; (iv) sharing informa-
tion used in evaluations; (y) discussing evaluation
results with other donors; (vi) joint evaluations.
The framework for these joint activities exists
through the SPA.
Evaluating the Impact of Programme Aid
Funds
The bulk of the analysis of aid effectiveness is con-
ducted at the microeconomic level through the use
of cost benefit analysis. There is also a literature
analysing aid's macroeconomic impact, particularly
the link between aid, growth and domestic savings
and, more recently, fiscal behaviour and the real
exchange rate. But much of the latter literature is
flawed (White 1992a and 1992b) and, anyhow,
conducted at too aggregate a level to assist us in the
macroeconomic analysis of programme aid. That is,
most models treat aid as an aggregate with no
9
allowance for differential macroeconomic impact
from different types of aid (there are a few excep-
tions e.g. Doriye and Wuyts 1992; and White
1994: Ch. 4). There is also a tradition of modelling
the impact of food aid, using techniques up to
and including CGEs (e.g. Roth and Abbot 1990;
and Hoffman et al.. 1994) which may offer insights
for the evaluator in search of experience and
methodology.
Despite these caveats, programme aid thus rests
uneasily between the established areas of analysis.
Its main rationale is macroeconomic, but little has
been done to develop appropriate tools for the
analysis. To the extent that existing evaluations
have looked at macroeconomic impact (e.g. those
by Doriye et al. 1993; and Bhaduri et al.. 1993,
both on Tanzania) they have been concerned with
all aid, rather than balance of payments support
per se. What passes for macroeconomic analysis in
other studies is merely descriptive (e.g. ratio of
import support to total imports).
Many evaluations have restricted their focus to the
microeconomic level - analyzing the commodities
imported with the import support and the effect on
capacity utilization in beneficiary firms (e.g.
Skarstein et aI. 1988). Microeconomic analysis of
import support is, however, of dubious validity
because of the problem of fungibility However,
there are three reasons for conducting micro
level analysis. First, the aid may not be fully
fungible - though whether it is or not is a macro
issue. Second, as argued by Cassen (1986),
donor involvement in the activity may change
the nature (hopefully improve the quality of) that
activity Finally, and more practically, donors must
be able to pin their funds to some goods or
activity
The rationale for programme aid is macroeconomic
and the ultimate evaluation of its effectiveness must
be made at the macroeconomic level. The most
appropriate methodology would be macroecono-
metric modelling - as Carlsson et al. say 'single-
country simulation models probably offer the best
technique for isolating the impact of aid flows'
(1994: 107; see also White 1992a: 227-228).
However, we are confronted with limited data in an
often unstable economic environment, so that esti-
mation of parameter values becomes an impossible
task.12 In the absence of an agreed methodology,
the evaluator must resort to a series of ad hoc pro-
cedures. One of the few studies to tackle these
issues is that of Mwanawina and White (1995) on
Zambia, in which the analysis of the relationship
between balance of payments support and the level
of imports is carried out with a decomposition of
the accounting framework for the sources and uses
of forex. This framework also provides the basis for
the construction of model of fungibility for a coun-
terfactual analysis of both the level and composition
of imports. These techniques are discussed in the
paper on macroeconomic analysis in this volume.
lt is only by capturing the effect of, say, BOP sup-
port on the availability of forex, and the use made
of that increased availability that we can move to a
discussion of wider macro effects (on investment,
growth etc.). Even if we manage to establish the
link from aid to certain groups of imports (capital,
intermediate and consumer), the link from each of
these to growth must also be established. For
example, in some circumstances capital imports
may even be detrimental to further growth,
whereas, on account of incentive goods effects, con-
sumer imports can be beneficial.
One issue of macroeconomic concern that is fre-
quently discussed in evaluations is that of the pos-
sible inflationary impact of counterpart funds. For
this aspect of the impact of BOP support the
methodological issues have been clearly laid out by
Bruton and Hill (1991), though the appropriate use
of counterpart funds remains a topic of debate.
The macroeconomics of debt relief
There are two important issues in discussing the
macroeconomic effects of debt relief: (i) whether
the debt would have been paid in the absence of
the debt relief and (ii) if there is a debt overhang.
These two aspects are shown together in Table 4.
If the recipient would not have paid the debt in the
absence of the relief, then the relief does not directly
'2White and Edstrand (1994) report the difficulty of finding
non-spurious macroeconomic relationships in the case of
Zambia, which is ascribed to the frequent changes in policy
regime.
' This argument is, of course, just a statement of fungibility.
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contribute any new resources. If properly accounted,
the debt relief flows in on capital account (if a loan) or
current account (if a grant) and the inflow is imme-
diately offset by an equivalent outflow on either
or both capital account (for relief on principal pay-
ments or capitalized interest arrears) and current
account (for relief on interest payments). On the
other hand, to the extent that the recipient would
have paid the debt, then the relief is equivalent to free
forex (since the money that would have been used in
payment is now available for alternative uses).'314
Debt overhang is the notion that investment is
constrained by high levels of debt, a mechanism
which can operate through several channels (see
Borensztein 1990; and Serven and Solimano 1992:
107). Hence, reducing the debt burden may stim-
ulate both foreign and domestic investment in the
recipient country, even if the debt relief itself
directly provides no additional funds. Aid will not
alleviate debt overhang either if there is no problem
of overhang in the first place, or if there is a prob-
lem but the relief is insufficient to eliminate it.
The impact of debt relief may also vary according
to the modalities of the relief, in particular depend-
ing on whether there is a local currency payment to
be made, the rate used to value that payment and
the conditions attached to its use (including NGO-
financed debt for nature or debt for development
'swaps'). Different forms of debt relief are dis-
cussed in Faber (1992) and van Kersten (1994).
Budget support, counterpart funds and
fiscal behaviour
Although budget support and counterpart funds are
differentiated by the donor's focus on local currency
and forex respectively, the analytical issues they raise
for the evaluator are identical. Most of the discus-
sion has focused on the potential inflationary impact
of spending local currency raised by the sale of forex
donated by donors. The issues involved here are
summarized in Bruton and Hill (1991) (see also the
paper by Maxwell in this volume).
' Construction of a counterfactual balance of payments, as
discussed in the next paper, requires projections of debt
payments. Such projections can be made with the debt
management software now available in many countries - but
the expertise requires another addition to the evaluation
team or, better still, a link with the appropriate office in the
recipient Ministry of Finance.
There has been far less attention paid to the impact
of the local currency receipts on recipient fiscal
behaviour.15 A partial exception has been the EU,
which has 'soft tied' countervalue to budget lines
in the social sectors - a policy that Caputo says
has been of 'doubtful effectiveness'. But existing
evaluations do not explore the impact of the pro-
gramme aid on revenue, borrowing and overall
government spending or consider the composition
of expenditure. There is an established academic
literature in this area (a recent review being in
White and Luttik 1994).
5 Conclusions: Where to Go from
Here?
The papers presented here demonstrate a need to
further develop our understanding of how to evalu-
ate programme aid. But what exactly to evaluate
or how to go about it? All are agreed on the need
for evaluating the reform programme. Most donor
agency officials agree that this task cannot be left
to the IFIs. Most accept that the impact of the
reforms must be examined using a with versus
without methodology which precludes the use of
before versus after. However, it is not commonly
Questions of fiscal impact must be resolved to determine
any potential inflationary impact. But evaluations have
failed to implement the Bruton-Hill' framework and so not
had to confront the issue.
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understood that the same analytical precision
needs be applied to implementation of the reform
programme itself, not only its effects.
There is mileage to be had - for both the quality of
programme aid and evaluations of that aid - from a
more systematic examination of the rationale and
objectives for programme aid, and the channels
through which these objectives are to be achieved.
The log frame is likely to prove a useful tool in this
regard, as it will be in the development and agree-
ment of indicators for the montoring and evaluation
of programme aid.
Over the next year more donors are going to be
using budget support as their preferred form of pro-
gramme aid. Such a move fits better with donors'
concern for the poor, and makes it easier to hold the
recipient government accountable than does the
import support destined for the private sector. But
donors need better studies on incidence (Healey
1996) and an understanding of how public expen-
diture can benefit the poor (Addison 1996). Public
expenditure reviews (PERs) have a vital role to play
here, though the responsibility for effective public
expenditure must ultimately lie with the recipient.
Table 4 The macroeconomic effects of debt relief
Does the relief
alleviate debt
overhang?
No
Yes
Would recipient pay debt in
absence of debt relief?
No Yes
No effect
Stimulate Increase in free forex
investment and stimulate investment
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